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Negotiations Between the  
WGA and AMPTP: 
How to Avoid Strikes and Still 
Promote Members’ Needs 
 
Jillian N. Morphis* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Every day, families, neighbors, couples, employees, bosses, businesses, 
consumers, salesmen, lawyers, and nations face . . . [the] dilemma of how to 
get to yes without going to war.”1  In late 2007, the Writers Guild of 
America (WGA) and the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television 
Producers (AMPTP) spent months trying to get to yes; however, they were 
unsuccessful and started a war in the form of a strike.2 
The WGA is a union that represents thousands of writers from television 
shows, movies, news programs, documentaries, animations, and “new 
media.”3  Its principal duty is to bargain with the AMPTP on behalf of 
writers to ensure that their rights are upheld.4  Primary issues addressed by 
the WGA include writers’ credits, residuals, education, legislation, 
 
* Jillian Morphis is a Juris Doctor candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law and a 
Certificate in Dispute Resolution candidate at the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution, 2012.  She 
is also a Literary Citations Editor for the Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal.  Jillian 
received her Masters in Business Administration from San Diego State University in 2007, and her 
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from California State University, San Marcos in 
2005. 
 1. ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN xi (2d ed. 1991). 
 2. See generally Carole E. Handler, James D. Nguyen & Marina Depietri, The WGA Strike: 
Picketing for a Bigger Piece of the New Media Pie, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Winter 2008, at 2. 
 3. Guide to the Guild, WGA WEST, 1, 
http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/who_we_are/fyi09.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2011).  Writers are 
represented by two affiliated organizations, the Writers Guild of America, West (WGAW) and the 
Writers Guild of America, East (WGAE), collectively referred to as the WGA.  See Bernadette A. 
Safrath, Comment, How Improvements in Technology Have Affected the Entertainment Industry: 
Writers and Actors Fight for Compensation, 26 TOURO L. REV. 115, 116 (2010). 
 4. See Guide to the Guild, supra note 3, at 1. 
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registration of written materials, and ultimately, the enforcement of 
contracts.5 
The AMPTP is an association that represents over 350 production 
companies and studios (the studios) in negotiating collective bargaining 
agreements.6  It negotiates with essentially all entertainment industry unions, 
including the WGA.7 
The agreement that eventually ended the 2007 strike expired May 1, 
2011, marking the first time since the strike that the WGA and AMPTP 
faced the challenge of bargaining.8  The parties were successful in reaching 
an agreement six weeks prior to the expiration date, which is a rare 
occurrence.9  Unfortunately, the speedy agreement cannot be attributed to 
improved bargaining techniques.  Further, the 2011 negotiation was not the 
only time the parties needed to be on high alert; a potential strike will be a 
concern every three years, when it is time to negotiate a new agreement.10  
Future years may well present a bigger test because, with time, the parties 
will forget the destructive impact the strike had on the industry and may 
become less risk averse in their approach to bargaining. 
Part II of this article describes the collective bargaining agreement that 
is the subject of WGA and AMPTP negotiations.  Part III outlines the 
history of WGA strikes, including descriptions of previous strikes and the 
strategies that led to an impasse.  Parts IV and V describe strategies that 
could have prevented the 2007 strike and improved the 2011 negotiations if 
the parties had implemented them, including negotiation and mediation 
techniques.  Part VI examines the impact previous strikes had on the most 
recent negotiations and provides suggestions for what strategies will be most 
effective in the future.  Part VII concludes this article. 
 
 5. See Guide to the Guild, supra note 3, at 1-5. 
 6. About Us, AMPTP, http://www.amptp.org/aboutus.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2011). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Richard Verrier, Writers Guild Inks Bargaining Goals for Upcoming Contract Talks, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/2010/12/writers-
guild-.html. 
 9. See Dave McNary, WGA, AMPTP Agree on New Contract, VARIETY, Mar. 30, 2011, 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118034164. 
 10. See 2008 Writers Guild of America: Theatrical and Television Basic Agreement, WGA 
WEST, 6, http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/writers_resources/contracts/MBA08.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2011) [hereinafter 2008 Agreement]; Memorandum of Agreement for the 2011 WGA 
Theatrical and Television Basic Agreement, WGA WEST, 1, 
http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/writers_resources/contracts/MOA2011.pdf (last visited May 7, 
2012). 
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II. THE WGA’S COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 
The WGA and AMPTP bargain periodically to set the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement11 called the Theatrical and Television Basic 
Agreement, also known as the Minimum Basic Agreement (MBA).12  This 
agreement is negotiated every three years and dictates the employment terms 
and compensation of WGA members.13  It controls areas such as credits for 
screen authorship and writers’ residuals and includes a “no strike” clause.14  
In this clause, “[t]he guild agrees that during the term hereof, it will not call 
or engage in any strike, slowdown, or stoppage of work affecting theatrical 
or television motion picture production against the Company.”15  However, 
because the contract expires after three years, the WGA has the right to call 
a strike when the term expires if the parties do not agree to a new MBA.16 
III.  HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS 
A.  Previous Strikes 
In 1988, the entertainment industry was going through similar 
transformations as it is today, with new technologies and markets emerging, 
viewer habits shifting, and writers’ demands changing.17  At the time, the 
studios demanded that writers accept a sliding scale residual payment 
 
 11. The AMPTP negotiates eighty collective bargaining agreements annually, one of which is 
the agreement with the WGA.  See David P. White, High Stakes: Negotiators for the Guilds and 
Studios Are Locked in a Showdown Over the Allocation of New Media Revenues, 30 L.A. LAW., no. 
3, 2007 at 24.  The agreements contain specific language setting forth the employee-employer 
relationship throughout each stage of the production process.  See id.  They “delineate a contract’s 
jurisdiction, minimum compensation rates, work conditions, and resolution procedures for disputes 
that arise during principal photography and pre- and post-production activities.”  Id. 
 12. See 2008 Agreement, supra note 10, at 6.  The process used to negotiate the MBA is made 
available by the WGA West.  See Process of Negotiating the WGA Minimum Basic Agreement, 
WGA WEST, http://www.wga.org/contract_07/process_neg.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2011) 
[hereinafter Negotiating Process]. 
 13. See 2008 Agreement, supra note 10, at 6. 
 14. See id. at 27-29, 197. 
 15. Id. at 27 (emphasis added). 
 16. See Negotiating Process, supra note 12. 
 17. See Sam Schechner, This Writers’ Strike Feels Like a Rerun from 1988, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
12, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119482950368089597.html. 
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structure, and writers demanded a greater portion of foreign sales revenue.18  
The parties reached an impasse, leading the WGA to endure a twenty-two-
week strike, which reportedly cost the industry $500 million.19  Some 
strikers lost their homes, some were not able to send their children to 
college, and others sought job opportunities in entirely different industries.20  
With more reruns airing than usual, the television industry as a whole 
suffered a decrease in viewership.21  The studios were not as unfortunate, 
however, as the strike occurred during the spring when television production 
typically slows down.22  This timing allowed the production companies to 
survive the strike almost unscathed.23 
With the help of a conciliator, a new MBA was developed in which 
writers agreed to sliding scale residual payments, and the studios agreed to a 
revised formula for foreign revenues.24  While much of the strike’s impact 
was lasting, the loss of viewers was only temporary because, with the main 
media distribution platform at the time being analog television, viewers had 
few substitutes to turn to for home entertainment.25 
After almost twenty years without another strike, the AMPTP and WGA 
had difficulties reaching an agreement again in 2007.26  The primary 
demands of the WGA in these negotiations included higher revenues from 
home video sales and new media.27  Anxiety levels in negotiations were high 
 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Jonathan Mandell, Recalling 1988 Strike, CBSNEWS, Feb. 11, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/02/entertainment/main3447509.shtml. 
 20. See id.  As a result of the 1988 strike, Fran Drescher and her husband launched Loaf & 
Kisses Gourmet Croutons, a business that continued even after the strike.  Id. 
 21. See Handler, Nguyen & Depietri, supra note 2, at 5. 
 22. See Schechner, supra note 17. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Handler, Nguyen & Depietri, supra note 2, at 5. 
 26. Id. at 3. 
 27. Id.  Although there are various definitions, 
 
[T]he term “new media” essentially applies to the expanding set of distribution platforms 
for traditional entertainment content as well as the evolving nature of the content, which 
is increasingly designed for emerging technologies and formats.  The term also includes a 
surfeit of innovations that recently have inundated the marketplace, particularly those 
capable of exploiting digital technology. 
 
White, supra note 11, at 25.  This category of content includes, but is not limited to, television shows 
and movies that are broadcast over the Internet, advertisements for television shows on mobile 
phones, and programs that are sold on iTunes.  See Safrath, supra note 3, at 117-18.  New media is 
central to the debate because of the “increasing popularity of content distribution through new media 
technologies and the publicity new media has received as an important source of expected future 
revenue as major studios enter these markets.”  Handler, Nguyen & Depietri, supra note 2, at 3. 
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due to the “unknown effect of recent advancements in technology on the 
very nature of film and television production, and on the business models 
that will yield the most revenue in such an unpredictable setting.”28  
Although new media was of utmost importance to the WGA members, 
writers also sought authority over reality television and prime time animated 
shows.29  Alternatively, the studios sought to preserve the existing DVD 
payment plans, and claimed that writers’ new media market demands were 
premature, as the structure of the industry and size of the pie were 
unknown.30 
The bargaining efforts were fruitless, and writers joined together in a 
strike that persisted for an arduous 100 days.31  The strike was detrimental to 
the industry, causing writer layoffs and a loss of viewers that might never 
return to pre-strike levels.32  Unlike television distribution in the 1980s, 
several major channels of communication now deliver entertainment content 
to viewers; although a settlement was reached to end the strike, viewers need 
not return to television for access to entertainment.33 
The 2007 contract that ended the strike expired May 1, 2011, marking 
the first time the WGA and AMPTP faced each other at the bargaining table 
since the strike.34  The big question was whether the parties would take a 
different approach to reach an amicable agreement.  The writers and studios 
shocked everyone by reaching an agreement in a mere two weeks, which 
was six weeks prior to the existing MBA’s expiration date.35  However, 
given how detrimental the 2007 strike was to the entertainment industry,36 
the parties should not get too comfortable just yet.  Taking into consideration 
 
 28. White, supra note 11, at 25. 
 29. See Handler, Nguyen & Depietri, supra note 2, at 3. 
 30. See id.  The studios claimed that they needed the present revenue share for DVD sales in 
order to offset marketing and production costs.  See id.  They also saw Internet as another way of 
promoting shows rather than seeing it as a revenue source, thus denying writers’ demands for a 
portion of Internet revenues.  See id. 
 31. See Michael Cieply, Writers Vote to End Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/business/media/12cnd-strike.html?_r=1. 
 32. See Handler, Nguyen & Depietri, supra note 2, at 5. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See McNary, supra note 9. 
 35. See id.  It is rare for the parties to reach an agreement this quickly; the two rounds of 
bargaining prior to the 2007 writers’ strike extended past the expiration of the agreements existing at 
the time.  Id. 
 36. According to AMPTP assessments, writers collectively lost $285 million in wages, and 
other film union workers lost $500 million.  See Cieply, supra note 31. 
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the rareness of this speedy agreement and the fact that the devastation was 
still relatively fresh in the disputants’ minds, red flags remain and peril still 
looms for future negotiations when the parties become less risk averse. 
B. The WGA’s and AMPTP’s Strategy in 2007 Negotiations 
“Whether a negotiation concerns a contract, a family quarrel, or a peace 
settlement among nations, people routinely engage in positional 
bargaining.”37  When utilizing the positional bargaining technique, each 
party takes a position based on its primary goals and then argues for that 
position, ideally making the concessions necessary to reach an agreement.38  
This technique is commonly used in negotiations; however, it tends to be 
inefficient and generally fails to generate sensible and amicable results.39  It 
was positional bargaining that made the WGA and AMPTP incapable of 
producing an efficient and amicable agreement in 2007, eventually leading 
the writers to strike. 
When engaging in positional bargaining, parties start “with an extreme 
position, by stubbornly holding to it, by deceiving the other party as to 
[their] true views, and by making small concessions only as necessary to 
keep the negotiation going.”40  The WGA and AMPTP did just this.41  The 
WGA stated its positions, which included establishing (1) a new formula to 
calculate writers’ DVD sales residuals; (2) authority for writers in the 
animated and reality television markets; and, (3) a plan for writers to receive 
residuals in the new media markets.42  The AMPTP also stated its positions, 
which were basically to resist the WGA’s demands and not allow writers to 
earn higher residuals at the expense of the studios.43  The parties tenaciously 
held to their positions and refused to make considerable concessions, as 
evidenced by the lengthy and costly writers’ strike.44  The parties 
presumably made insignificant concessions to make it appear that the 
 
 37. FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 1, at 3. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 4. 
 40. Id. at 6. 
 41. See Negotiating Process, supra note 12.  “The WGA and the Companies begin with 
opening proposals for changes in the MBA.  Some proposals are rejected outright and some lead to 
counter-proposals.  After much discussion and debate, the Guild and the Companies usually hold 
firm on some proposals, revise others and withdraw yet other proposals.”  Id. 
 42. See Handler, Nguyen & Depietri, supra note 2, at 3. 
 43. See id.  The studios sought to maintain the status quo with regards to DVD sales.  Id.  They 
claimed “to need their present revenue share to offset the ever-rising marketing and production costs 
of filmed and televised entertainment.”  Id. 
 44. See Handler, Nguyen & Depietri, supra note 2, at 3. 
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negotiations were progressing, but were ultimately too stubborn to settle the 
disputed terms of the agreement. 
Negotiations may involve several parties, but “[t]he more people 
involved in a negotiation, the more serious the drawbacks to positional 
bargaining.”45  This is a case with many parties to the agreement—thousands 
of writers and hundreds of studios.46  When thousands of writers collectively 
established that they deserved new media residuals, the AMPTP was hard-
pressed to convince them that they did not—results would be similar for 
positions adopted by the hundreds of studios. 
Battles often ensue when parties participate in positional bargaining, 
with negotiations essentially becoming a “contest of wills.”47  Parties to 
these battles often end up feeling resentful and angry.48  This anger and 
resentment was apparent in WGA negotiation committee member Howard 
Gould’s speech to 3,000 writers: 
[New media] residuals are going to go from what they are towards zero if we don’t make 
a stand now. . . .  [T]his is such a big issue that if they see us roll over on this without 
making a stand—three years from now, they’re going to be back for something else. . . .  
I might have been the most moderate one up here when we started, but I sat there in the 
room the first day and they read us those thirty-two pages of rollbacks.  And what they 
wanted us to hear was that “if you don’t give us what [we] want on the important thing, 
we’re gonna come after you for all those other things.”  But what I heard was, if we give 
them that thing, they’ll still come after us for those other things.  And in three years, it’ll 
be “we want to revamp the whole residual system.”  And in another three years, it’ll be 
“y’know what, we don’t really want to fund the health fund the way we’ve been.”  And 
then it’ll be pension.  And then it’ll be credit determination.  And there just is that time 
when everybody has to see—this is one where we’ve just gotta stand our ground.49 
WGA members who witnessed the speech gave Gould a standing 
ovation,50 showing approval of the idea that the writers should stand strong 
and not compromise.  By adopting positional bargaining techniques, the 
WGA and AMPTP lost all trust in each other and refused to accept defeat, 
resulting in a contest of wills.  The impending strike was inevitable. 
 
 45. FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 1, at 7.  When there are several parties to a 
negotiation, committees will sometimes be formed to negotiate for the majority.  Id. 
 46. See Guide to the Guild, supra note 3, at 1; About Us, supra note 6. 
 47. FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 1, at 6. 
 48. Id. 
 49. wgaamerica, Writer Speaks Out, YOUTUBE (Nov. 6, 2007), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=beMNePzqpzQ [hereinafter Writer Speaks Out]. 
 50. Id. 
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Once the strike began, 100 days passed before the writers agreed to lift 
the injunction and put an end to the strike.51  The final agreement gave 
writers jurisdiction in the new media market, provided Guild members with 
fair compensation for their Internet content, and established residual 
payments for content reused on new media.52  However, this agreement did 
not include increased DVD residuals or authority in the animation market, 
which the writers had originally demanded.53 
IV. NEGOTIATING AS A STRATEGY TO PREVENT A STRIKE 
“The answer to the question of whether to use soft positional bargaining 
or hard is ‘neither.’  Change the game.”54  At times, parties employ 
principled bargaining practices rather than positional bargaining, focusing on 
their fundamental interests, discussing options that are mutually beneficial 
for both parties, and maintaining fair values.55  Principled bargaining can 
produce sensible and harmonious solutions.56  If the writers and studios had 
utilized this technique, they could have reached a settlement in a more 
economical manner and without the hostility demonstrated by Gould’s 
speech.  Principled bargaining can be broken down into four points: “People: 
Separate the people from the problem.  Interests: Focus on interests, not 
positions.  Options: Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what 
to do.  Criteria: Insist that the result be based on some objective standard.”57 
A.  Separate the People from the Problem 
When dealing with major disputes involving organizations, the parties 
must keep in mind that human beings are at the bargaining table, not just 
organizations.58  The actions of the writers and studios suggest a failure to 
treat the opposing party as humans and an inability to focus sufficient time 
on the people problem.  “To find your way through the jungle of people 
 
 51. See Writers Guild Members Overwhelmingly Ratify New Contract, WGA WEST (Feb. 26, 
2008), http://www.wga.org/subpage_newsevents.aspx?id=2780.  With 4,060 votes cast in New York 
and California, 93.6% of guild members voted to end the strike and agree to the terms of a new 
contract.  Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See generally 2008 Agreement, supra note 10. 
 54. FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 1, at 10. 
 55. Id. at 14. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 10-11. 
 58. Id. at 22. 
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problems, it is useful to think in terms of three basic categories: perception, 
emotion, and communication.”59 
While awareness of the impartial reality of a dispute is valuable, 
problems typically arise when the parties’ perceptions of reality are not 
aligned.60  Looking again at Gould’s speech, although the studios alleged 
that they would compromise on the less significant components of the 
dispute in order to “win” on the more substantial issues—which they may 
have actually intended to do—the writers did not perceive this as a truthful 
claim.61  This is due in part to the never-ending disputes between the 
AMPTP and the WGA regarding fair pay, revenue sharing, and the 
AMPTP’s failure to follow through with promises.62  For instance, when the 
cost of producing VHS tapes was excessive, writers agreed to receive low 
residuals in the VHS market in exchange for a promise from the studios to 
increase the compensation when earnings improved.63  Yet when VHS, and 
later DVD, profits grew, the studios never modified the formula used to 
calculate writers’ residuals.64  In simple terms, one writer saw the WGA as 
the Charlie Brown and saw the AMPTP as the “arrogant and menacing 
Lucy.”65  When Lucy would prop up a football and tell Charlie Brown to 
kick it, Charlie Brown would repeatedly attempt to do so, and then Lucy 
would always pull the ball away.66  Just as Charlie Brown began to doubt 
Lucy’s intentions, the WGA could not help but doubt the AMPTP’s 
intentions.  Based on past negotiations, the WGA’s version of reality was 
that even if the writers compromised on the more significant components of 
the dispute, they would not “win” on the less significant issues as promised 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 23. 
 61. See Writer Speaks Out, supra note 49. 
 62. See e.g., Mark Dawidziak, Possible Writers Strike Could Threaten TV Season, Movies, 
THE PLAIN DEALER (Oct. 30, 2007, 6:00 PM), 
http://blog.cleveland.com/top_entertainment/2007/10/possible_writers_strike_could.html (stating 
that the 2008 writers’ strike was the fifth writers’ strike since their first strike in 1973, with issues 
commonly being centered around residuals); Conglomerates Not Making New Media Payments to 
Writers, WGA WEST (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.wga.org/content/default.aspx?id=3384 
(explaining that the AMPTP media conglomerates failed to comply with the contract that ended the 
2008 writers’ strike). 
 63. Michael Russnow, The WGA Strike for Dummies: Why Is It Taking So Long, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Jan. 20, 2008, 11:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-russnow/the-wga-strike-
for-dummie_1_b_84190.html. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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by the studios;67 even if the studios promised future residuals, they would 
never be paid.68  Thus, while the studios bargained as if their claims were 
true, the writers bargained based on their perceived reality that these claims 
were false, and therefore, the parties never reached an agreement. 
In addition to gaps between reality and perceived reality, the writers’ 
pessimism was damaging to the bargaining process.  Potentially productive 
ideas are often rejected when viewed with pure cynicism.69  Writer Michael 
Russnow, bitter from previous relations with the AMPTP, used terms such 
as “absurd” and “pitiful” in his description of WGA and AMPTP 
bargaining.70  With such a pessimistic attitude, even if justified, writers were 
bound to perceive almost any offer from the studios in a dismal light.  As 
soon as the writers determined that the studios were willing to make false 
claims in order to gain their desired results, there was no longer trust 
between the parties, and all ideas were rejected regardless of their potential 
to advance bargaining efforts. 
Misperceptions and pessimism are not the only things that harm the 
negotiation process, emotions have created problems as well.71  Disputants 
must clearly communicate their emotions to one another and refrain from 
writing these emotions off as illegitimate.72  For example, writers Howard 
Gould and Michael Russnow made their emotions known to fellow WGA 
 
 67. See Writer Speaks Out, supra note 49. 
 68. See Russnow, supra note 63.  Russnow pointed out, 
[Writers] believed the AMPTP when they cajoled us to accept the cable deal in 1981 with 
the understanding that when they stopped rerunning old black and white shows and 
started making serious money they would take care of us. 
 
We believed the AMPTP when they cajoled us in 1985 to accept the definition of gross to 
be one fifth of the monies they received, because the VHS industry was new and those 
cassettes were expensive to make.  When it became really profitable they would take care 
of us. 
 
Well, they did become profitable, even more so when they switched to DVD and its 
much cheaper manufacturing costs.  And of course, the cable industry grew and grew as 
it became more and more the norm for shows to rerun directly from their original 
broadcast network home not on broadcast local stations, but rather on cable networks . . . 
.  Ad rates for those reruns—hot off the network—soared through the roof. 
 
And guess what, they didn’t change the payment formula. 
 
Id. 
 69. See FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 1, at 25. 
 70. See Russnow, supra note 63. 
 71. See FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 1, at 29. 
 72. Id. at 30. 
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members and to readers of the Huffington Post,73 but there is no indication 
that they communicated these emotions to the studios.  Directly 
communicating their emotions to each other would have enabled the parties 
to focus their time and energy on the more meaningful issues of the dispute. 
Basic communication is another area of concern when dealing with 
people, for “[w]ithout communication there is no negotiation.”74  Proper 
communication requires parties to go beyond simply speaking with one 
another, both must make a good faith effort to sincerely listen to and 
understand what is being said.75  Parties often listen only to their own side 
and pay no attention to that of the opposing parties, causing negotiations to 
be unproductive.76  In the WGA’s negotiations with the AMPTP, the writers 
told the studios that they felt they deserved residuals in the new media 
market and higher residuals in the DVD market,77 but the parties never 
properly communicated because the studios did not sincerely listen to and 
understand the writers’ stated positions.  The AMPTP ridiculed the writers’ 
demands for higher residuals,78 but it does not appear that the studios truly 
knew of what the writers’ demands consisted.  Specifically, the studios 
dismissed “any comparison between the Internet and broadcast or cable, and 
[said] it’s absurd to presume that the $20,000 hour-long prime time residual 
would be possible or relevant for reruns on the Internet.”79  But according to 
Russnow, the writers never said “that either $20,000 or the $12,000 prime-
time residual fee that half-hour shows receive should be paid for reruns 
transmitted on the Internet.”80  This may have been an error in the writers’ 
attempt to correspond clearly with the studios, an error in the assumptions 
made by the studios, or both, but the result was a failure to properly 
communicate. 
While avoiding misperceptions, expressing emotions, and properly 
communicating may help solve people problems, the most effective way to 
 
 73. See Russnow, supra note 63. 
 74. Id. at 32. 
 75. Id. at 33. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Handler, Nguyen & Depietri, supra note 2, at 3. 
 78. Russnow, supra note 63. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  When broadcast or cable is replaced with the Internet, the fees should be adjusted to 
accurately reflect the amount writers, directors, and actors receive in syndication, which are fees 
significantly lower than the prime time rerun rates of $20,000 or $12,000.  Id.  “These monies are in 
the mid-thousands for subsequent runs and descend in value as rerun usage increases until the 
payments are in the hundreds of dollars.”  Id. 
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deal with these problems may be to avoid them altogether.81  The writers’ 
strike may not have occurred had the WGA and AMPTP evaded the people 
problems initially by considering each other as partners pursuing a mutually 
beneficial solution to their disputes. 
B. Focus on Interests, Not Problems 
“The basic problem in a negotiation lies not in conflicting positions, but 
in the conflict between each side’s [interests, such as its] needs, desires, 
concerns, and fears.”82  Parties’ interests are generally the primary 
considerations when adopting positions.83  Interests should be the parties’ 
primary focus as more than one position can fulfill each interest.84  For 
instance, the writers wanted an adaptation of their DVD sales residuals and 
wished to earn residuals in the new media market.85  The concealed interests 
the writers sought to fulfill by making these demands were to rectify issues 
with the existing formula,86 to earn fair compensation for new media work, 
and to be economically stable during the cycles of joblessness anticipated in 
this line of work.87  The studios simply resisted the WGA’s demands when 
they should have looked for substitute solutions to fulfill these underlying 
interests. 
Disputants often focus too much on how to further their own interests 
and fail to acknowledge the interests of others.88  The writers publicly 
announced a concern that “[e]very issue that matters to writers, including 
Internet reuse, original writing for new media, DVDs, and jurisdiction, has 
been ignored.”89  The studios were seemingly too consumed with their own 
interests, not wanting to give up a portion of their residuals, and neglected to 
acknowledge the writers’ desires.  “[I]f you want the other side to appreciate 
your interests, begin by demonstrating that you appreciate theirs.”90  Had the 
AMPTP exhibited an appreciation for the WGA’s desires, even if they did 
 
 81. See FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 1, at 33. 
 82. Id. at 40. 
 83. Id. at 41.  Interests define the problem, therefore the “basic problem in negotiation lies not 
in the conflicting positions, but in the conflict between each side’s needs, desires, concerns, and 
fears.”  Id. at 40. 
 84. Id. at 42. 
 85. See Handler, Nguyen & Depietri, supra note 2, at 3. 
 86. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Writers Guild of America Strike, GAFOOR LAW (Feb. 28, 2008), 
http://www.gafoorlaw.com/writers-guild-of-america-strike. 
 88. FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 1, at 51. 
 89. Contract 2007 Negotiations Statement, WGA WEST (Oct. 31, 2007), 
http://www.wga.org/subpage_newsevents.aspx?id=2526. 
 90. FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 1, at 51. 
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not agree with them, the parties may have been productive enough in 
negotiations to prevent the strike. 
C.  Invent Options for Mutual Gain 
Often when bargaining, “[t]here seems to be no way to split the pie that 
leaves both parties satisfied.”91  Likewise, with the principle dispute between 
the AMPTP and the WGA rooted in the division of money, the parties were 
at a loss as to how to split the pie.92  Four barriers often hinder parties when 
developing options: “(1) premature judgment; (2) searching for the single 
answer; (3) the assumption of a fixed pie; and (4) thinking that ‘solving their 
problem is their problem.’”93 
Disputants often make impulsive decisions because the ability to devise 
and consider various options is typically a learned skill.94  The studios 
alleged that the parties were at an impasse “because the WGA continued to 
press a series of unreasonable demands that have nothing to do with new 
media and the real concerns of most working writers.”95  Their conclusion 
that the writers’ requests were too demanding was hasty and prevented the 
parties from considering mutually beneficial alternatives.  It is a common 
problem for competitive negotiators to consider the interests of the opponent 
irrelevant unless those interests in some way maximize their own returns.96  
Further, disputants worry that presenting alternatives puts their negotiating 
power at risk by revealing sensitive information.97  For example, the studios 
may have been concerned that the writers would interpret the presentation of 
options as an indication that they were definitely willing to concede on 
particular matters.  Allowing disputants to present alternatives without 
requiring them to commit to one right away can minimize this risk.98  It 
would have been wise of the parties here to brainstorm to discover mutually 
 
 91. Id. at 56. 
 92. This method of negotiating is referred to as distributive bargaining.  See Distributive 
Bargaining, U. COLO., http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/distbarg.htm (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2011). 
 93. FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 1, at 57. 
 94. Id. 
 95. The State of the Strike: Day 47 An Open Letter to the Entertainment Industry from the 
AMPTP, AMPTP (Dec. 21, 2007), http://www.amptp.org/statements/122107.html (emphasis added). 
 96. See John S. Murray, Understanding Competing Theories of Negotiation, 2 NEGOT. J. 179, 
182 (1986). 
 97. See FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 1, at 58. 
 98. See id. at 60. 
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beneficial alternatives, or at a minimum to better explore solutions to the 
primary issues. 
When parties adamantly believe that there is only one answer to a 
problem, they will not explore other options.99  The AMPTP and the WGA 
fell victim to this trend and failed to invent alternatives for fear of 
complicating the bargaining process.  If the writers and studios choose to 
brainstorm in the future, they must look for options of varying strengths 
rather than one best solution.100  For instance, if a request for authority in the 
new media market is too demanding, a feebler request may be authority in a 
particular niche of this market.  The more alternatives the parties develop, 
the more hope they have of discovering a mutually beneficial solution. 
Third on the list of things preventing the development of mutually 
beneficial options is the fact that disputants often believe that in order for 
one party to gain a bigger piece of the pie, the other must give something 
up.101  This was a difficult issue for the writers and studios, because as the 
parties saw it, the writers demanded larger pieces of pies that would make 
the studios’ pieces smaller.  Nevertheless, the WGA and AMPTP need not 
have given up.  “Even apart from a shared interest in averting joint loss, 
there almost always exists the possibility of joint gain.”102  Several pies were 
the subject of bargaining between the writers and studios, such as the new 
media and DVD pies.103  Therefore, making a compromise in one pie could 
encourage an expansion in a different pie to the satisfaction of all involved. 
Finally, the development of options is hindered when the parties are all 
consumed by their own interests, which is typically getting a larger slice of 
the pie.104  An agreement will not be achieved if the parties refuse to explore 
options that satisfy both groups.  In the negotiations between the WGA and 
AMPTP, both the studios and the writers were so concerned with their own 
interests that they were unable to appreciate that both parties could gain by 
making the pies larger.  For instance, they could have enlarged the new 
media pie by making use of the market’s superior demographic records and 
targeted marketing capabilities, thus enlarging each party’s slice of pie.  The 
studios would likely have been more agreeable to a solution that benefited 
both parties rather than a solution that fulfilled only the writers’ desires. 
 
 99. See id. at 58. 
 100. See id. at 69. 
 101. See id. at 59. 
 102. Id. at 71. 
 103. See Handler, Nguyen & Depietri, supra note 2, at 3. 
 104. See FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 1, at 59. 
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D.  Use Objective Criteria 
“However well you understand the interests of the other side, however 
ingeniously you invent ways of reconciling interests, however highly you 
value an ongoing relationship, you will almost always face the harsh reality 
of interests that conflict.”105  Here, the WGA suggested solutions that spoke 
to writers’ interests and refuted the studios’ interests, the AMPTP declined 
to agree with these suggestions, and each party awaited the withdrawal of 
the other.  Bargaining is more effective when based on objective standards 
instead of efforts to make the opposing party surrender.106 
Objective standards are often discovered utilizing fair procedures or fair 
standards.107  The existing DVD sales residuals formula would be made 
objective if rooted in a fair standard such as market value, instead of being 
based on arbitrary demands for double what the existing formula yielded.  
Furthermore, this same formula would be made more objective if derived 
from a fair process such as employing an arbitrator or expert to divide DVD 
earnings as they see fit. 
V.  MEDIATING AS A STRATEGY TO PREVENT A STRIKE 
Even principled bargaining has its weaknesses,108 and if this approach 
proves unsuccessful, the parties should consider mediation before calling a 
 
 105. Id. at 81. 
 106. Id. at 83. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Murray, supra note 96, at 184.  Murray lists the common weaknesses associated with 
positional bargaining techniques, also known as “problem-solving” bargaining techniques: 
 
1.Strong bias toward cooperation, creating internal pressures to compromise and 
accommodate. 
 
2.Avoids strategies that are confrontational because they risk impasse, which is 
viewed as failure. 
 
3.Focuses on being sensitive to other’s perceived interests; increases vulnerability 
to deception and manipulation by a competitive opponent; and increases 
possibility that settlement may be more favorable to other side than fairness 
would warrant. 
 
4.Increases difficulty of establishing definite aspiration levels and bottom lines 
because of reliance on qualitative (value-laden) goals. 
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strike.  In mediation, a neutral third party, also known as the mediator, helps 
participants in the dispute come to an agreement.109  Mediation allows the 
parties to maintain control of the case and to shape a conclusion with the 
help of a third-party neutral.110  Parties should choose to mediate “[w]hen 
any or all of the following are factors: costs, time, confidentiality, efficiency, 
effectiveness, resource conservation, a desire to preserve the relationship of 
the parties, civility or when traditional judicial remedies do not serve the 
needs of the parties.”111  While the preferred alternative dispute resolution 
method varies by industry, most firms across all industries list mediation as 
their preferred technique.112 
A. Confidentiality of Mediation 
Confidentiality is one of the most important characteristics of mediation 
for a variety of reasons.113  “Effective mediation requires candor” in order to 
identify issues, explore options for agreement, and to uncover unknown 
causes of conflict between the parties; this process would be impossible if 
the parties were constantly concerned that what they said may later be used 
against them.114  Confidentiality is also necessary for the fairness of the 
parties because they do not expect to be bound by what they say in 
mediation discussions.115  Additionally, the mediator must keep information 
confidential in order to remain neutral in fact and neutral according to the 
perception of the parties.116  The WGA and AMPTP may not have been 
completely honest with each other, fearing that the other side would take 
 
 
5.Requires substantial skill and knowledge of process to do well. 
 
6.Requires strong confidence in own assessment powers (perception) regarding 
interests/needs of other side and other’s payoff schedule. 
 
Id. 
 109. See There Are Options to Litigation: What Are My Options?, L.A. SUPERIOR CT., 
http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/adr/UI/Info/whatis.aspx?source= (last visited Aug. 25, 2011) 
[hereinafter Options to Litigation]. 
 110. See Judith P. Meyer, The Pros and Cons of Mediation, DISP. RESOL. J., Summer 1997, at 8, 
11.  The mediator cannot conclude the case without the consent of both disputants.  Id. at 13. 
 111. Id. at 12. 
 112. See David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Patterns of ADR Use in Corporate Disputes, 
DISP. RESOL. J., Feb. 1999, at 66, 69. 
 113. See Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need 
for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 37, 37 (1986). 
 114. Id. at 38. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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advantage of this honesty.  With mediation, they could have been open and 
honest with the mediator without fear that their positions would be revealed 
to the other side, allowing the mediator to help determine what information 
may be beneficial to the discussions and what should remain private.  
Confidentiality is often the most desired characteristic of mediation.117 
B.  Efficiency of Mediation 
Another significant factor driving parties to choose mediation is the cost 
and time savings it provides.118  Sources often compare the costs of 
alternative dispute resolution methods to costs of litigation,119 but as already 
shown, the cost of a writers’ strike is also very high.120  Further, sources 
often compare the length of time spent on alternative dispute resolution 
methods to the time spent on litigation,121 but the time spent on a writers’ 
strike can also be lengthy.122  Mediation saved one company at least $50 
million in litigation costs, and they “typically last [only] the better part of a 
day.”123  The 1988 writers’ strike alone lasted twenty-two weeks, not 
including the months spent in negotiations prior to the strike, and cost an 
estimated total of $500 million.124  Had the WGA and AMPTP employed 
mediation, negotiations could have been shorter and millions of dollars 
could have been saved. 
C.  Preservation of the Relationship 
Research has shown that high stress can negatively affect otherwise 
cooperative behavior.125  Mediation provides an atmosphere in which the 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Meyer, supra note 110, at 12. 
 119. See Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 112, at 71. 
 120. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 121. See Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 112, at 71. 
 122. See supra text accompanying notes 19, 31. 
 123. Miguel A. Olivella, Jr., Toro’s Early Intervention Program, After Six Years, Has Saved 
$50M, 17 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 65, 65 (1999). 
 124. Mandell, supra note 19. 
 125. See Jeffrey L. McClellan, Marrying Positive Psychology to Mediation: Using Appreciative 
Inquiry and Solution-Focused Counseling to Improve the Process, DISP. RESOL. J., Jan. 2008, at 29, 
31. 
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expression of emotions can be controlled,126 and while the expression of 
emotions can be detrimental, a skilled mediator can help the parties put a 
more objective spin on their negative emotions.127  Without a neutral third 
party assisting them, the WGA and AMPTP were not provided the 
opportunity to express emotions in a controlled environment.  These 
uncontrolled emotions proved to be detrimental to the negotiations.  
Mediation can remove the adversarial component, helping to enhance the 
future relationship of the parties.128 
D. The Mediator’s Role 
Mediators generally use one of two basic styles: facilitative or 
evaluative.129  Evaluative mediators provide more direction as to the 
appropriate grounds for settlement, while facilitative mediators give the 
parties more control of the process.130  As a result, facilitative mediators 
simply enhance and clarify communications between the parties rather than 
provide evaluative direction.131  The choice of mediator type would be the 
decision of the WGA and AMPTP, allowing the parties to control the 
process even with the involvement of a third party. 
Leonard Riskin created a grid containing four categories of mediators to 
assist disputants in selecting a third-party neutral.132  The categories of 
mediators are (1) evaluative-narrow, (2) facilitative-narrow, (3) evaluative-
broad, and (4) facilitative-broad.133  The parties should use the grid to select 
 
 126. See William A. Blancato & C. Allen Gibson, Jr., Controlling Your Own Destiny: You Can 
with Mediation, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct. 2008, at 14, 20-21.  “The uncontrolled expression of negative 
emotions by a party or counsel can quickly derail a mediation.”  Id. at 21. 
 127. See id. 
 128. Options to Litigation, supra note 109. 
 129. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES 
TO HIGH COST LITIG. 111, 111 (1994). 
 130. Id.  Evaluative mediators use law, industry practices, and technology as their bases for 
evaluation.  See id.  Facilitative mediators recognize that the parties are “intelligent, able to work 
with their counterparts, and capable of understanding their solutions better than either their lawyers 
or the mediators,” and in turn, give the parties more control of the process.  Id. 
 131. Id.  According to the facilitative mediator, providing an opinion is inappropriate because 
this might impair the appearance of impartiality.  Id.  Additionally, the mediator might not have the 
knowledge to provide an informed opinion.  Id. 
 132. Id. at 114. 
 133. Id. at 112.  Evaluative-Narrow mediators “help the parties understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of their positions and the likely outcome at trial” by providing assessments of relevant 
documents, pleadings, mediation briefs, etc.  Id.  Facilitative-Narrow mediators “help the parties 
become ‘realistic’ about their litigation situations” without making their own assessments, 
predictions, or proposals.  Id.  Evaluative-Broad mediators take a similar approach to that of an 
Evaluative-Narrow mediator, but they emphasize their understanding of the parties’ interests rather 
than focusing on narrow issues, and propose solutions to accommodate these interests.  Id. at 112-13.  
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a mediator based on “informed expectations about the problems to be 
addressed and what they need from a mediation.”134 
Subject matter expertise can be an important factor to consider when 
selecting a mediator.135  For the WGA and AMPTP, a mediator with 
specialized knowledge in the entertainment industry and familiarity with the 
writing process would have been ideal.  The need for subject matter 
expertise typically increases when the parties seek an evaluative mediator 
and is less important when the parties are capable of developing solutions 
themselves.136  However, even when the parties are capable of developing 
solutions, they may still need a skilled mediator to facilitate the process.137  
The WGA and AMPTP may have been knowledgeable regarding their 
circumstances, but they lacked the ability to develop solutions during the 
2007 negotiations; therefore, a highly skilled mediator with subject matter 
expertise would have been valuable. 
VI.  IMPACT 
A.  Strategy Used in 2011 Negotiations 
During the most recent negotiations, as the writers and the studios 
converged at the negotiation table for the first time since the 2007 strike, the 
issue was whether the parties would take a different approach in order to 
reach an efficient and more mutually beneficial agreement.  There was great 
speculation that negotiations would not be easy.138  Many may have 
predicted that with the resistance of the AMPTP in the previous 
negotiations, and considering the fact that the WGA did not get the deal they 
had hoped for in 2007, the writers might come to the table with less 
 
This style of mediator provides predictions, assessments, and recommendations to the parties.  Id. at 
113.  Facilitative-Broad mediators help the disputants identify, comprehend, and settle problems, 
encouraging them to consider underlying interests.  Id. 
 134. Id. at 114. 
 135. Id.  Subject matter expertise can include knowledge about the relevant law or the 
customary practices in the industry.  Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Jonathan Handel, WGA Sends Out ‘Pattern of Demands’ Seeking Major Contract 
Improvements, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Dec. 22, 2010, 5:28 PM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/wga-sends-pattern-demands-seeking-65036. 
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demanding requests this time.  But this was not the case.  The “Pattern of 
Demands” released by the WGA was of an ambitious scope.139 
Much to everyone’s surprise, the writers and studios reached an 
agreement in only two weeks, six weeks before the 2007 MBA was even set 
to expire.140  Key gains for writers in the 2011 MBA included an increase in 
pension contributions and an increase in pay television residuals.141  A major 
concession made by the writers was a freeze in prime time residuals for the 
term of the three-year contract.142  While this may be viewed as a success, 
with the writers making some advances and given the promptness of the 
settlement, WGA President John Wells admits that “much remains to be 
done.”143  He acknowledges that the writers have positioned themselves “for 
some hard and important work in the years ahead as [they] endeavor to 
further the needs and rights of [their] members.”144  With so much progress 
to still be made, there is still great danger of future strikes. 
Whether or not writers truly view the 2011 agreement as a victory, the 
settlement cannot be attributed to improved bargaining techniques.  Rather 
than pursuing a mutually beneficial agreement in an efficient manner, the 
parties rushed into a settlement.145  Several veteran writers have even gone 
so far as to “[call] this the worst deal they’ve ever been handed.”146  As one 
critic points out, the agreement came at a time “when nearly all writers 
[were] wringing their hands and hanging by their fingernails to maintain 
their livelihoods under the studio and network cutbacks.”147  Another critic 
brought light to the fact that the agreement was beneficial to Wells’s private 
interests and presumed that he encouraged writers to simply accept the 
studio’s first draft without addressing the areas most important to the 
majority of WGA members.148  The interests  the writers were forced to 
concede in order to end the strike in 2007, such as increased home video 
residuals, are still missing from the new agreement.149  Accepting an 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 141. See McNary, supra note 9. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Writers Guild Members Overwhelmingly Ratify New Contract, WGA WEST (Apr. 27, 
2011), http://www.wga.org/content/default.aspx?id=4591. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See infra text accompanying notes 147-48. 
 146. Nikki Finke, Tentative WGA-AMPTP Contract: Writers Guild Negotiators Cave to Studios 
& Networks After Only 2 Weeks; Critics Say “They Accepted Producers’ First Draft” , 
DEADLINE.COM (Mar. 20, 2011, 7:33 PM), http://www.deadline.com/2011/03/wga-amptp-come-to-
congract-agreement/. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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unsatisfactory settlement offer and failing to represent the interests of writers 
in order to reach a speedy resolution is not a successful negotiation 
technique.  The WGA must vastly improve its definition of a successful 
resolution before it can claim a victory.  The parties must adopt more 
effective bargaining techniques to ensure long-term success. 
In order to be truly successful in future negotiations, the WGA should 
make demands that are mutually beneficial for all parties.150  The writers 
failed to do this in the 2011 negotiations; many speculated before the 
process even began that their proposal was “likely to elicit concern among 
studio executives because it [sought] many different monetary increases plus 
significant changes in the script development process.”151  Among the 
WGA’s one-sided demands were “increases in minimums and employer 
pension and health contributions and more money for new-media reuse and 
programs made for pay cable and basic cable,” a move away from one-step 
deals and toward multi-step deals,152 increases in home video residuals,153 
and jurisdiction in animated television.154 
The WGA made the same mistakes in 2011 that it made in 2007 by 
engaging in positional bargaining155 techniques in its negotiations with the 
AMPTP.  The writers created a high level of anxiety amongst the parties up 
front, likely on purpose in order to establish a power position, as this is the 
“first step in the posturing and positioning that marks most labor 
negotiations.”156  Because the relationship already lacked trust,157 creating 
 
 150. See supra Part IV.C. 
 151. See Handel, supra note 138.  This appears to be similar to the “Pattern of Demands” 
proposed for the 2007 negotiations, which also included several monetary demands: “[f]air 
compensation and residuals for writing for the Internet and other non-traditional media; [i]ncreased 
initial compensation in all areas; [i]ncreased minimums and residuals for The CW; [i]ncreased DVD 
and videocassette residual payments; [and] expanded WGA coverage of reality programs and 
animation.”  Writers Guilds Issue Pattern of Demands for Contract 2007 Negotiations: Key Issues 
Include New Media, Reality TV and Animation Jurisdiction, DVD Residuals, and Product 
Integration, WGA WEST (May 18, 2007), http://www.wga.org/subpage_newsevents.aspx?id=2370. 
 152. Handel, supra note 138 (“Writers dislike one-step deals not only because the money is less 
(unless the writer is then hired to do revisions), but also because it gives the writers only one shot to 
get it right.”). 
 153. With the twenty-five-year-old formula for home video residuals, “80% of DVD revenue is 
swept off the table before the residual is even calculated.”  Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Positional bargaining is a process in which the parties claim positions based on their ideal 
final outcome, argue for those positions, and make compromises in pursuit of a settlement.  See 
FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 1, at 3.  Positional bargaining is generally unsuccessful when a 
party is attempting to reach an efficient and amicable agreement.  Id. 
 156. Handel, supra note 138. 
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anxiety before negotiations even began was risky, causing each party to 
bargain aggressively in order to show authority.  While this did not pose a 
problem in 2011, this technique may make bargaining a “contest of wills” 
and create more of a battle than a mutually beneficial negotiation in future 
years.158  Anxiety was also high in the 2007 negotiations,159 and the results 
were damaging. 
An increase in home video residuals was a primary concern of the 
writers during the 2007 and 2011 contract negotiations and remains a 
concern because the WGA has repeatedly withdrawn the request in order to 
reach agreements with the studios.160  Better communication between the 
parties may help the writers realize this goal, as there were apparent 
miscommunications in 2007.161  In order to be successful in the future, the 
writers must remedy the miscommunication that initially led the studios to 
assume that the WGA was demanding more in DVD residuals than it was 
actually seeking. 
Jurisdiction in animated television was also one of the writers’ concerns 
during the 2007 and 2011 contract negotiations, but just as the WGA 
withdrew the home video residual request, it also withdrew this request in 
order to reach an agreement with the studios.162  While this appears to be an 
ongoing issue, it has not been as predominant in the media as DVD residuals 
have been.  Animation jurisdiction may be a good area for compromise, and 
the WGA may benefit from giving up this request in the future in order to 
appear to be seeking a mutually beneficial agreement with the AMPTP. 
B.  Strategy Most Likely to Avoid Future Strikes 
The most effective approach, given the circumstances of the WGA and 
AMPTP negotiations, will be principled bargaining with an option of 
mediation if necessary.163  While the parties may be experts in the industry 
 
 157. Not only was trust lost during the strike, but the parties have had additional issues since 
2007.  See Conglomerates Not Making New Media Payments to Writers, supra note 62.  In 2008, the 
WGA announced that the media conglomerates of the AMPTP “failed to comply with the contract 
negotiated to end the Guild’s 100-day strike and [were] not paying residuals for writers’ work that is 
reused in new media.”  Id. 
 158. See FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 1, at 6. 
 159. See supra text accompanying note 28. 
 160. See Handel, supra note 138. 
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.  Because the “Pattern of Demands” for the 2011 
negotiations did not contain numbers and specifics of the writers’ demands, it is unclear how 
effectively this demand was conveyed in the most recent bargaining. 
 162. See Handel, supra note 138. 
 163. See supra Parts IV-V. 
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and skilled negotiators, there may come a time when the parties recognize 
that negotiations are fruitless and that they must choose another approach.164 
By utilizing principled negotiating skills, the parties will be aware of 
people problems, thus separating the people from the problem and 
preventing them from getting in the way of reaching a settlement.165  
Because of the many years they have worked together, the parties inevitably 
have reputations and expectations, some false and some accurate, that may 
easily become the central issues in negotiations.  However, the parties must 
recognize this potential trap and maintain sight of the more substantial issues 
present during negotiations.166  Although the AMPTP may not have followed 
through on some promises in the past, assuming that this will be an ongoing 
pattern will be detrimental to future discussions.167  If the writers hope to 
reach an agreement with the studios, they must come into negotiations with a 
positive outlook, rather than predict that everything will end up in the “worst 
case scenario.”  Additionally, while it is good to express emotions, that 
expression should be limited in a noncontrolled environment.168  When the 
writers or studios do express emotions, both parties should attempt to 
understand them and acknowledge them as legitimate rather than viewing 
the emotions as problematic.169 
Most critical to preventing the people problem from dominating the 
issues at hand is to ensure effective communication between the WGA and 
AMPTP.170  It will be natural for the studios to reject the requests of the 
writers automatically, assuming that the requests will be contrary to the 
interests of the studios.  However, if the studios truly listen to and 
understand the writers’ requests, they may discover that there are ways to 
fulfill these requests without necessarily giving up anything.171 
If the WGA and AMPTP use principled bargaining, they will focus 
more on interests than on problems.172  Using this strategy, the parties will 
uncover various concealed interests that can satisfy a single problem, 
 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 135-37. 
 165. See supra Part IV.A. 
 166. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra Part V.C. 
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73. 
 170. See supra text accompanying notes 74-80. 
 171. See supra Part IV.C. 
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57. 
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allowing for more settlement alternatives than they initially anticipated.173  
For example, the WGA wants a larger portion of DVD sales revenues, and 
they may think that taking a larger portion of this pie is the only answer.  
Instead, they should attempt to make the pie larger by changing marketing 
strategies or increasing sales in some way.174  By making the pie larger, both 
parties can increase their DVD sales revenues, and both will benefit.  
Principled bargainers should be able to put themselves in the shoes of the 
opposing party, understand that the party’s requests are legitimate, and work 
to find a mutually beneficial solution. 
Principled negotiating will allow the writers and studios to come to an 
objective solution using fair standards and procedures.175  They can use 
objective numbers in dividing revenue pies; for example, they can look at 
the time spent by writers versus the time spent by other talent involved in the 
process of certain media and then divide revenues accordingly.  If the parties 
cannot reach an objective agreement, they may benefit from choosing a 
more fair procedure, such as utilizing a mediator in the process.176 
The WGA and AMPTP may benefit greatly if a third-party neutral 
facilitates their negotiations.177  Mediation would not only allow the parties 
to settle quickly, as they did in the 2011 negotiations, but would also allow 
them to maintain control of the process in order to better represent their 
members’ interests.178  The WGA and AMPTP may be concerned that 
bringing in a third party would cause them to give up control, thus 
surrendering their ability to pursue their members’ best interests, but this 
concern is unwarranted because both parties must agree to a settlement.179  
For example, a mediator could not force the studios to give up DVD 
residuals, nor could he force the writers to give up their requests in the new 
media market. 
Given that the public is highly interested in the WGA and AMPTP, 
these organizations180 must strive to maintain confidentiality in their 
negotiations.  Communications during the mediation will remain 
confidential from the public; therefore, the studios can make statements in 
mediation without fear that the other unions with which it negotiates will use 
 
 173. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87. 
 174. See supra text accompanying note 104. 
 175. See supra Part IV.D. 
 176. See supra Part IV.D. 
 177. See supra Part V. 
 178. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 180. This public interest is evidenced by the numerous news articles regarding their 
negotiations and strikes. 
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these statements as leverage in their own bargaining efforts.181  There will 
also be confidentiality between the parties; therefore, the writers will be free 
to admit to the mediator that they are willing to concede jurisdiction in 
animated television in order for their new media request to be fulfilled, 
without fear that this will be revealed to the studios prematurely.182  This 
level of confidentiality will permit the WGA and AMPTP to communicate 
candidly enough to identify hidden interests and reach creative 
settlements.183 
If the parties choose to mediate early in the negotiations, they can save 
time that might otherwise be dedicated to unproductive negotiations and 
strikes.184  The writers and studios should agree on a time limit for 
negotiations, such as one month, and attempt mediation if they have not 
reached an agreement within that time.  Mediation, even for large 
organizations, can be accomplished in as little as one day, which is 
preferable to spending months negotiating and managing strikes.185  This 
process will not only save time, but will also save money for everyone 
involved, including the writers, studios, and others working in and affected 
by the entertainment industry. 
Because the WGA and AMPTP negotiate every three years, they should 
have a strong interest in maintaining a positive relationship.186  Although the 
parties’ intense emotions have caused their relationship to break down in the 
past, in the future, a mediator can work as an intermediary to calm the 
parties’ emotions and put a more positive spin on their negative views.187  
This may improve the relationship between the writers and studios enough to 
eventually eliminate the need for a mediator in future negotiations. 
When selecting a mediator, parties will likely benefit from someone 
who is an expert in the industry, highly skilled in mediation, and has a broad 
focus.188  The entertainment industry is unique, so it may be helpful to 
choose a mediator who understands the issues being presented.  
Additionally, a skilled mediator would also be valuable to these parties to 
ensure proper execution of the process.  The WGA and AMPTP have been 
 
 181. See supra Part V.A. 
 182. See supra Part V.A. 
 183. See supra text accompanying note 113-16. 
 184. See supra Part V.B. 
 185. See supra text accompanying note 123. 
 186. See supra Part V.C. 
 187. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra Part V.D. 
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negotiating with each other for many years and likely have skilled 
negotiators leading the discussions for each party.189  But if these skilled 
negotiators cannot reach an agreement, it may take a skilled mediator with 
subject matter expertise to dig deep and assist the parties in identifying 
hidden interests.190  Alternatively, because the parties have specialized 
knowledge in a unique industry, a broader approach may also be sufficient.  
For example, the writers do not necessarily need the mediator to recommend 
what residuals are appropriate.  However, they may need a mediator to put a 
positive spin on their negative emotions and help them determine what 
issues they should concede.  Thus, the WGA and AMPTP do not need 
narrowly focused guidance as much as they need a broadly focused 
facilitator.191 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although the WGA and AMPTP reached agreements that ended the 
strikes in 1988 and 2007, the strikes were costly and inefficient uses of time 
and could have been avoided.  Three years after the 2007 writers’ strike, 
writers negotiated a new MBA with the studios, unexpectedly reaching an 
agreement in only two weeks.  However the speed of the agreement can be 
attributed less to improved bargaining techniques and more to the risk 
aversion caused by the recent 2007 strike.  The parties will need to remain 
aware of best practices for negotiations in future years to ensure efficient 
agreements that represent WGA members better than the 2011 agreement.  
Thus, if they separate the people from the problem, focus on the interests of 
each party rather than on their own positions, invent solutions that provide 
mutual gain, and use objective criteria, then negotiations between the parties 
will be more efficient and amicable.  If the parties are unable to reach an 
agreement that is favorable to their members, they should hire a neutral third 
party to mediate their discussions.  This mediator will help the WGA and 
AMPTP maintain control of the dispute while facilitating the discussions, 
allowing the parties to reach an agreement and avoid future writers’ strikes. 
 
 
 189. See supra text accompanying note 131. 
 190. See supra text accompanying notes 135-37. 
 191. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
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